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NEW LEFT ORGANIZERS AND THE POOR
Myles H. Whitney Paul J. Champagne
North Adams State College Michigan Technological University
INTRODUCTION
The decade of the sixties witnessed a resurgence of radical or
leftist movements in the United States as manifested in the political
activism of college students, civil rights organizations, community
groups and others. Today, in the post-Vietnam era of the seventies,
the fires of the New Left appear to have been dampened. But even
though these groups may be less visible and vocal today, it would be a
mistake to think that their ideas are no longer of interest to certain
segments of our society. Some contemporary New Left groups, while out-
wardly rejecting dramatic Marxist revolutionary tactics have instead
engaged in grass-roots organizing efforts at the community level.
What follows is an analysis of one such New Left organization,
Western Massachusetts Labor Action (WMLA), an affiliate of the National
Labor Federation (NATLFED). Prior literature regarding NATLFED and its
branch associations ("entities") has been descriptive of the organiza-
tion, but heavily propagandistic (National Labor Federation, 1976; Leg-
gett and Mouldner, 1976). Here, we attempt a critical examination of
WMLA both as a representative entity of NATLFED and as an example of an
independent effort to organize the poor. The essential question address-
ed is the manner in which grass-roots, community-based groups can best
organize the poor to improve their living conditions in American society.
We contend that the most appropriate perspective with which to
answer such a question takes into account both recent attempts to organ-
ize the poor and a pluralistic model of social power. The obvious bene-
fit of studying recent attempts to organize the poor is the understand-
ing of the actual experience of others as well as the gaining of insight
into probable results of methodologies previously applied. Such recent
strategies of organizing the poor as the Community Action Programs
(CAP'S), the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) and Cloward and
Piven's "tactics of disruption" prove especially helpful in this regard.
But as helpful as information about organizing the poor is, such
understandings and insights are of limited value to the practicioner
without an accompanying grasp of social power in America as a pluralis-
tic model of competing interest groups. Extensive arguments for this
point of view have been presented by Robert Dahl (1961), Nelson Polsby
(1963), and Arnold Rose (1967). Our position, which assumes the utility
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of the pluralistic model, is that the poor can make substantial gains
as an organized interest group, but that the traditional Marxist orien-
tation of the New Left which emphasizes discontent leading to "the
revolution" is conceptually incorrect and therefore counterproductive
as an underlying world-view for organizers of the poor.
THE STRUCTURE AND NATURE OF WMLA
WMLA, operating under the auspices of the National Labor Federa-
tion, is a community-based organizing drive. The National Labor Feder-
ation or NATLFED, strives to organize "unrecognized" labor throughout
the United States. Numbering close to fifty million, these unrecog-
nized workers are those who are excluded from the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, and thus do not share in the benefits of unionization. Cur-
rently there are fourteen separate entities operating under this nation-
al umbrella with NATLFED serving to coordinate and synthesize the most
effective organizing tactics. In this way they hope that strong and
successful programs can be built all over the country.
Operating primarily in Berkshire County of Western Massachusetts,
WMLA is one of these fourteen organizing drives. Membership includes
the elderly, disabled, unemployed, underemployed, service workers, do-
mestics, factory and farm workers. The basic philosophy expressed by
WMLA is to strive for lasting changes in the living and working condi-
tions of these people.
Western Massachusetts Labor Action neither receives nor desires
federal or state funding, a fact of which the organization is quiteproud. The major reason given for not accepting such funds is that they
would influence the nature and direction of the organization's programs,
as well as diminish membership participation in problem solving. In-
stead, support comes from contributions made by private individuals
through bucket drives, house to house canvassing, donations, plus month-ly dues of 62 cents paid by active members. The programs and benefits
of WMLA are, however, available to anyone whether or not they contri-
bute to the organization's support.
WMLA refers to its organizing structure as "systemic organizing."
The total daily operations of the organization are divided into four-
teen interconnected segments: Daily Operations, Administrative Assist-
ance, Cadre, Procurement, Financial Input, Volunteers, Benefits, Member-
ship, Print, Design and Advertising, Propaganda and News, Transportation,
Speaking Engagements and Housing. Each of four full-time organizers
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("cadre") is responsible for the maintenance of various segments of the
system.
Each segment has specific functions. The Daily Operations segment
supervises and coordinates the activities of all systems and is respon-
sible for the overall operation of the organization. Administrative
Assistance provides aid for the Daily Operations Manager to insure that
activities are carried out as planned. Cadre functions as a personnel
department, seeing to it that conflicts between members are mediated.
Procurement obtains the donations necessary for the continuation of the
staff and programs of the organization. Benefits provides food, clo-
thing, medical and informational services to the membership of the com-
munity. Financial Input plans fund raising activities necessary to
meet the rent and utility bills. Print prepares and makes copies of
literature such as leaflets for bucket drives in front of supermarkets,
membership canvassing and upcoming fund raising events. Design and Ad-
vertising does the initial layout and editing of this literature. Pro-
paganda and News is responsible for the production of the monthly news-
letter. Transportation involves the scheduling of cars and other trans-
portation donated by volunteers and the membership. The system of
Speaking Engagements is responsible for lectures and talks at local
schools, churches and other meeting places which are done to promote
support and understanding of the organization in the local community.
Housing is concerned with the upkeep of the staff's living accomodations
and arranges for workers or cadre to spend a night or two per week in
the home of a supporter or member.
Full-time cadre are responsible for the coordination of their
"mini-systems" and report on each at weekly staff meetings. A written
analysis of each subsystem is prepared monthly. Evaluation is provided
by the Daily Operations Manager in the form of an analysis of the pre-
vious month. Evaluation might cover what has been accomplished, what
has yet to be done, and feedback from the membership concerning issues
of importance. In addition to these reporting devices, each subsystem
coordinator must periodically write out tactic sheets and procedures for
all activities contained within his or her system. For example, a food
stamp workshop might involve preparing: (1) an explanation of its pur-
poses (e.g. reduce the price for certain groups, solidify current mem-
bership, recruit new members), (2) the mechanics of the workshop (e.g.
devising a worksheet, preparing an outline), and (3) "tools" used in the
activity (e.g. worksheet, pencils, press releases, posters).
The rationalized and specialized bureaucratic nature of systemic
organizing is clearly illustrated by the filing system used within the
WMLA office. Material is numerically filed and designated as "interior"
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or "exterior" depending upon whether the content of the information is
related to the workings of WMLA only or to the entire NATLFED operation.
Files are numbered such that each pair of numbers for a given file can
be sequentially broken down to indicate; (1) whether the file is inter-
ior or exterior, (2) the system of the organization to which it applies,
(3) the subject it deals with, and (4) any further notations or comment.
Membership in WMLA is strictly voluntary and there are a number of
ways to enter the organization. Once recruited, all volunteers are sub-
ject to a pre-planned training program which includes an orientation to
the history of WMLA and NATLFED plus an outline of its purposes and
goals. An information sheet detailing biographical data, special
skills and the individual's areas of interest is filled out on each and
every volunteer. The organization places great importance on volun-
teers, and all systems, not only Volunteers, have recruitment respon-
sibilities. Training occurs in regularly held classes categorized as
Level I, II or III. Level I classes are designed to give newcomers an
orientation to and understanding of food stamps, AFDC (Aid for Families
with Dependent Children) and similar welfare services. Level II classes
serve as a bridge between Level I and Level III. The theoretical and
political content of Level II largely depends upon the perceptions and
social awareness of those individuals in attendence. Just as a worker
who approaches WMLA for an emergency food voucher is not immediately
"hit" with talk of NATLFED and a united worker front, so new members
are guided into an understanding of Marxist policy a bit at a time.
Level III classes involve detailed discussions of attempts made by the
working class throughout history to enter the political arena and pro-
mote long term social change.
A typical day scheduled for a cadre (full-time organizer) might
include an 8:30 a.m. briefing (a run-down of the day's schedule), a
9 a.m. appointment at the local welfare office with a member, a bucket
drive in front of a supermarket until noon, a speaking engagement at
2 p.m. and a membership canvas (door to door recruitment) from 4 to 6
p.m. Perhaps that evening there might be a class or volunteer orienta-
tion from 7:30 until 10 p.m. Beyond this, cadre must also find time for
systems work.
WMLA has a dual organizational nature which is apparent from a de-
scription of its major action focus, the Benefits I and Benefits II pro-
grams - referred to as "BENE I" and "BENE II." In order to insure mem-
bership, WMLA attempts to give immediate and tangible aid to its members.
This it does through BENE I, a program that provides members with needed
free clothing, food and vouchers for emergency food, food stamp tests
for eligibility, non-emergency dental care and information and referral
-681-
regarding unemployment and workmen's compensation. In addition, under
BENE I the organization also acts in an advocacy role in issues of
housing, utilities, legal services, etc.
While BENE I is certainly of prime importance, WMLA organizers are
aware that their ultimate goal of working for lasting changes in the
living and working conditions of the membership cannot be achieved by
providing only hand-outs. They must teach members the methods of organ-
izing. To this end, cadre conduct open "brainstorming" sessions on
Saturday afternoons during which activities of the previous week are
reviewed and areas of recurring need identified. The organizers dis-
cuss these problems, and consider strategies for combating them. WMLA
cadre see this process of defining immediate and recurring needs as a
strong organizing tool which can be used to map out the direction of
planned social change. This strategy, much more theoretical and long-
range than BENE I, is known as BENE II. The cadre look to the day when
BENE II will be a system in itself and lasting changes in lifestyle and
social power will begin to be realized by the membership.
RECENT ATTEMPTS TO ORGANIZE THE POOR
NATLFED and the WMLA entity are engaged in a concentrated effort
to organize the "unrecognized" workers, i.e., the adult poor, of Amer-
ica. They are not, however, the first group to tackle the task, nor do
they represent the only methodology currently being applied. In the
past decade elaborate designs to organize the poor have been espoused
by the federal government, social policy analysts, community organizers
and the poor themselves.
During the 1960's the federal government waged a "War on Poverty"
using the Community Action Programs (CAP's) of the Office of Economic
Opportunity (OEO) as its primary weapons system.1 CAP's were locally
oriented and operated programs whose mission was to eliminate poverty in
targeted urban or rural areas. CAP agencies attempted to involve the
poor, mobilize resources, coordinate efforts, plan, conduct and evaluate
programs, advocate for the poor and pursue administrative reform in re-
1Although the federal government gives "lip service" to in-
volvement of the poor in current antipoverty funding programs (e.g.
grants-in-aid, Title XX, general revenue sharing), it is our position
that these mechanisms do not systematically encourage poor persons to be
organized on their own behalf.
-682-
levant institutional structures. Involvement of the poor was the key
and was encouraged by the famous Section 203(a) of the Economic Oppor-
tunity act which mandated CAP's to be "Developed, conducted and admin-
istered with maximum feasible participation of the residents of the
area, and members of groups, served" (Brokensha, 1974). This then was
the federal government's major attempt to organize the poor into self-
help action agencies. Poor persons, as staff members, board members
and advisory council members were organized to impact social institu-
tions affecting the poor and to stimulate structural changes within
those institutions.
But CAP's did not prove to be effective in improving the condi-
tions of the poor. One problem resulted from CAP conflict with the lo-
cal establishment. CAP monies could bypass city hall and even stimu-
late marches and other protests against locally entrenched power groups.
The local political establishment responded by complaining to Washing-
ton, which resulted in the cancelling of programs without regard to
their success in improving the condition of the poor. The local social
service establishment also resisted CAP's by campaigning for antipover-
ty monies to be channeled into the existing social service network ra-
ther than into new, competing social action agencies. Another basic
problem was the drain of capable indigenous leaders who were able to
escape to middle-class life by means of the CAP agencies and the fre-
quent use of remaining community leaders as mere "window dressing" (i.
e. high visibility, but low decision-making power) by antipoverty pro-
grams (Clark and Hopkins, 1969).
A second group who might be referred to as "social policy analysts"
have also shown considerable interest in organizing the poor. The past
decade has seen a multitude of exhortations (for example Terrell, 1967;
Thurz, 1966) for social action among various professional groups. The
basic argument here is that social workers, lawyers, city planners, men-
tal health specialists, etc. who work with the poor should make their
primary committment to what Terrell (1967) has called "group advocacy."
They must abandon ethically neutral positions and take strong value
stances in which the interests of the poor are the focus of an advocacy
which directly confronts the injustices and inequalities in the system.
These action-oriented professionals should create and support groups
representing the interests of the poor, form action committees to devise
strategies and coordinate advocacy efforts, and enter into political
coalitions when advantageous. While this group advocacy argument has
received much attention in the literature, in practice organized group
advocacy at the local level is uncommon. It is often, however, an im-
portant focus of state and national interest groups such as the NASW
(National Association of Social Workers) who take stands and lobby re-
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garding issues of significance to the poor.
In addition to encouraging an active strategy of involving commit-
ted professionals to serve as organizing leaders, some social policy
analysts have developed theoretical models of the way in which the poor
might effectively organize and act to improve their conditions. An
example is Cloward and Piven's (1974) construct of the "tactics of dis-
ruption." Such tactics might include boycotts, sit-ins, traffic tie-
ups, rent strikes and other behaviors "intended to command attention
and to win concessions by the actual trouble they cause in the ongoing
operations of major institutions" (Cloward and Piven, 1974: 86). It
is felt by these analysts that deviating in particular ways from pre-
scribed behavior is a realistic method by which the poor can place pres-
sure on bureaucrats, cause excitement for the media, displease influ-
ential members of the community, create strain for political leaders
and convert these "disruptions" into gains. One of the specific propo-
sals of Cloward and Piven was an idea to undermine the public welfare
system by organizing nation-wide campaigns to register all eligible
poor for relief as well as help existing recipients obtain their full
benefits. The hope was that the welfare bureaucracy would become so
overloaded (i.e. "disrupted) that it would prove politically and finan-
cially expedient to dispose of it altogether and replace it with a guar-
anteed annual income that would eliminate poverty. Critics of these
tactics of disruption pointed to the ability of bureaucratic institu-
tions to repress disruption or resist it by simply delaying or offering
mild but appeasing reforms. Critics also felt that the lack of popular
middle-class support for the poor and the need for professional exper-
tise (e.g. organizers, lawyers) would undermine large scale disruptive
action (Cloward and Piven, 1974).
Other theorists have formulated more abstract principles and models
by which organizing strategies and tactics can be analyzed and evalua-
ted. These social action theorists are concerned with the basic issues
common to all organizing efforts, how they interrelate and how they are
resolved. Pruger and Specht (1969), for example, subdivide organizing
efforts into three major areas; the problem, the methods of action and
the assessment of outcomes; and proceed to develop a set of analytical
questions useful in the understanding and evaluation of organizing tech-
niques.
"Community organizers" represent a third category of persons who
have shown an interest in organizing the poor. These organizers have
devoted their efforts to refining tactics out in the community, as was
the case with Saul Alinsky. Alinsky has endeavored to form "People's
Organizations" (or "mass organizations") of "Have-Nots" who desire to
take power away from the "Haves" and participate in the operation of
their communities in a democratic way (Alinsky, 1946). Ideally, Alin-
sky would see such communities with mass organizations as the building
blocks of a national popular powerforce. These mass organizations
would create a "popular reformation" of values and institutional pat-
terns which would, in turn, lead to a revolution where the "Have-Nots"
would take power away from the "Haves."
It is not, however, these grandiose schemes of change on a nation-
al or world-wide scale that Saul Alinsky is most remembered for. His
more useful contribution has been a "nuts and bolts" approach to or-
ganizing tactics and strategies. Drawing upon his own forty years of
organizing experience and those of his followers, Alinsky has developed
a body of pragmatic, realistic precepts, useful for the organizer of a
"Have-Not" community. These "rules for radicals" which include such
topics as communication within the experience of others; the understan-
ding of power, self-interest and compromise; the entrance of an organ-
izer into a community; building organizational power; and the use of
morality, law and justice against the "Haves" (Alinsky, 1971) have
proved important in several successful organizing efforts, such as
those in Chicago, Rochester, Oakland and New York.
The "Alinsky Ideology" has become quite popular and influential
among organizers since World War II. Critics of Alinsky contend that
he was too limited by his concern with specific, immediate activity in
a small geographic area and possessed no basic critique of American so-
ciety that could serve as direction for a program of major institutional
change on a national scale (Reissman, 1967).
A fourth category of persons who have expressed concern in organ-
izing the poor are the poor themselves. In the past decade only a few
organizations of poor people have been able to command a nationwide
audience. Among the more notable were the Poor People's Campaign of
1968 and the National Welfare Rights Organization. The Poor People's
March on Washington and its five week encampment in Resurrection City
was an attempt to arouse the conscience of the nation, make known the
needs and problems of the poor and gain tangible reforms from Congress
and the social welfare bureaucracy. The Campaign succeeded in promo-
ting a great deal of national media attention, but was otherwise inef-
fective. The Campaign's focus proved to be much too broad (e.g. fifty-
seven pages of demands ranging from public relief to diplomatic ties
with Portugal). Leadership was also a problem. The death of Martin
Luther King removed charismatic leadership from the March and internal
disputes among the remaining notables precluded solidarity. But the
major weakness of the Poor People's Campaign was its inability to sus-
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tain the protest over an extended period of time. The government merely
waited for them to go home (Steiner, 1971).
The National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) seems to have been
the poor people's association with the most potential and the greatest
success. Begun in 1966, the NWRO peaked organizationally in 1969 with
a membership of 100,000 welfare recipients in 350 chapters nationwide.
Membership was characteristically black, female, urban and northern.
Its central office was headed by the competent and highly regarded
George Wiley, a chemistry professor who had been a leader of CORE (Con-
gress on Racial Equality). Wiley worked hard to establish a self-suf-
ficient, dues supported, formal organization that would be attractive
to potential members. NWRO's issue focus was specific and imediate:
improve access to and increase levels of AFDC (Aid for Families with
Dependent Children) benefits. It sought to impact the political estab-
lishment by creating a powerful nationwide lobby of welfare recipients
who utilized non-violent but disruptive tactics such as sit-ins, ral-
lies, advocacy and mass benefit programs (i.e. recruiting large numbers
of eligible recipients to demand inclusion on the roles or all the be-
nefits due to them) (Steiner, 1971).
NWRO successes were substantial. Nationally, the organization's
recruitment drives and welfare consciousness-raising contributed to the
doubling of the country's relief rolls during the 1960's (Piven and
Cloward, 1971). Locally, mass benefit programs proved economically
successful in many instances. For example, the NWRO effort which in-
formed welfare recipients of their eligibility for "special grants" for
clothing and furniture in New York City increased benefits fourfold
over one year's time from $3 million in June 1967 to $13 million in June
1968. Organizationally, NWRO was noteworthy as it (1) provided mutual
support for groups fighting the welfare establishment, (2) provided a
vehicle for recipients to be represented on committees by peers rather
than by social workers, and (3) established an associational (i.e. civic)
tie for AFDC mothers (Steiner, 1971).
Much of NWRO's success in the late 1960's can be linked to its asso-
ciation with various federal programs fighting the 'War on Poverty."
NWRO's and OEO antipoverty agencies were closely related. OEO agencies
frequently organized and funded NWRO chapters. VISTA volunteers were
common as organizers. Legal assistance programs brought suits against
the welfare bureaucracy on behalf of NWRO clients. Sympathetic welfare
social workers became inclined to approve applications and less apt to
arbitrarily terminate cases (Cloward and Piven, 1974). In addition,
NWRO entered into contract arrangements with federal agencies, most no-
tably a $435,000 grant awarded from the Department of Labor to place
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welfare clients in leadership roles in the WIN (Work Incentive Program)
program (Steiner, 1971). However, as Vietnam came to supercede pov-
erty as the nation's war, and Nixon replaced Johnson in the White House,
OEO began to fade from the scene along with its associated antipoverty
efforts, including the NWRO.
Other problems were evident beyond NWRO's heavy reliance on fed-
eral sources of support. NWRO was never able to generate substantial
power on a national level. Membership reached about one to two percent
of its potential, and little money was ever available for organizing
greater numbers (Steiner, 1971). A key weakness of NWRO involved its
inability to move from a focus on individual grievances to concentra-
tion on mass campaigns which would have proveded greater potential for
large scale participation (Piven and Cloward, 1971). Finally, NWRO
suffered from a deficiency of indigenous leaders as those most fit to
lead were also in a position to remove themselves from the ranks of
the poor (Steiner, 1971).
RECOMMENDATIONS
Any attempt to organize America's poor and thereby improve their
position in society must take into account certain basic realities. As
Whitney Young of the Urban League stated to the 1969 national conven-
tion of NWRO, "What makes America tick is organization. It only re-
spects power organized." In other words, the poor must become an organ-
ized power element within America's pluralistic power structure if their
goals and interests are to be supported and furthered. How can this be
accomplished?
We would contend that for WMLA or any grass-roots organization in-
terested in building social power for the poor, at least six basic is-
sues must be addressed:
(1) The goals or game plan should be specific, have both
short and long-term components and reflect realistic,
accurate knowledge of the target system. For WMLA,
short-term goals would include a gradual increase in
the BENE I program, an accompanying recruitment of
core and active personnel and a thorough study of the
organizational values and workings of governmental
relief bureaucracies. Long-range goals such as con-
sciousness-raising through educational programs and
objective improvement in the status of the poor will
be discussed later in the paper.
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(2) The target system(s) of any organizing effort must
be explicit. Those systems in which change would
be most beneficial to the conditions of th. poor
should be clearly identified and focused upon. WMLA
and its parent organization, NATLFED, have sought to
organize "unrecognized" workers through grass-roots
campaigns. Their successes (e.g. the Eastern Farm
Workers Association on Long Island) have been pri-
marily in terms of "point of production" Labor-man-
agement issues resolved by organizing labor into
unions powerful enough to carry out long strikes.
But, WMLA2 identifies with no such "point of produc-
tion" issue involving labor-management conflict, at
this time. What WMLA has instead is a large number
of unemployed workers and relief recipients toward
whom they have directed their BENE I efforts. It
is our contention that this unemployed, welfare and
workfare (e.g. CETA, WIN) population represents le-
gitimate and needy "unrecognized" workers. They
embody a "point of production" (i.e. target) in the
form of local, state and federal relief bureaucra-
cies. Government relief agencies are indeed ex-
ploiting the poor by creating a cheap labor pool
which forces recipients to accept poorly paid "make
work" jobs. 3 This should be the logical target for
WMLA organizing efforts.
(3) Leadership should be centralized and composed of re-
spected and identifiable persons with the skills and
knowledge of planners and organizers. Charismatic
leadership should be voided unless it can be suc-
cessfully routinized.* We recommend that WMLA leaders
2 See also the Eastern Service Workers Association of New
Brunswick, N.J. discussed by Leggett and Mouldner (1976).
3 See also the discussion of "re-stratification" as applied to
domestic and welfare workers in National Labor Federation (1976: 4-15).
4For a discussion of routinization of charisma, see Max Weber,
The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, translated by Talcott
Parsons, (New York: Free Press, 1964); material regarding NWRO's George
Wiley as a leader may also be instructive here (Steiner, 1971).
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increase their abilities as social planners and
endeavor to establish closer working relationships
with key members of the relief bureaucracies.
(4) Resources are essential to organize the poor. Three
key resources are money from dues or other sources;
manpower in the form of core membership, general mem-
bership and friends and the capacity to disrupt the
smooth functioning of the target system. For WMLA,
member dues and bucket drives are inadequate and fi-
nancial backing from organizations and wealthy or
middle-class individuals whose contributions would
not require significant compromise of activist aims
is needed. WMIA's manpower core appears to be a
strong point, but the existence of a mass of suppor-
tive membership and influential community friends is
yet to be established. The capacity to disrupt,
whether real or simply a threat, is essential, and
WMLA should work to create the ability to mobilize
sizeable numbers of discontented relief recipients.
(5) Tactics are the means whereby goals are achieved. The
means we see as appropriate to a community-based organ-
izing effort such as WMLA might be termed "limited co-
operation" with the relief bureaucracy. WMLA should
seek to organize the clientele of the relief bureau-
cracies (e.g. the unemployed, CETA employees, welfare
recipients) in order to further their interests.
These interests could best be furthered by humanizing
the relief systems, i.e. making them more responsible
and responsive to the clientele. This humanizing
effort entails some cooperation since presumably some
relief system employees would support this type of
clientele effort. However, it is inevitable that sit-
uations will arise when clientele needs conflict with
those of the relief bureaucracy to such a degree that
employee support cannot be expected. In these instances,
WNLA must be able to exercise its capacity to disrupt
the operation of the bureaucracy through the use of some
form of confrontation.
(6) The image that an organizing movement presents to its
constituency, its target system(s) and the public is
important to its continued success. WMLA would bene-
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fit by presenting itself to its membership as a
strong, capable, and active advocate. A toned
down public self-image emphasizing WMLA's humani-
tarian concern for the treatment of needy persons
would appropriately complement the promotion of
an image of the relief bureaucracies as important
helping programs which consistently fail to meet
client needs.
CONCLUSION
We would suggest that the self-definition of WMLA and NATLFED as a
community-based benefits agency is a passing stage and would further
suggest that their ultimate concern is the elimination of inequality on
a societal level. However, to date neither WMLA nor any other New Left
group has presented a workable program for accomplishing this. Even
suggestions as mild as Negative Income Tax and Credit Income Tax (Gans,
1968) have met with little support from the public or Congress. A si-
milar proposal contributed to the downfall of McGovern in the 1972 Pre-
sidential election.
Economic and social inequality have, to date, been persistent
facts of community life. The current approaches of the New Left are
unlikely to change this. While they may succeed in redefining poverty
(i.e. upgrading the monetary circumstances of the poor and increasing
their share of the total wealth of society), poverty will continue. All
societies have shown a history of stratification (i.e. superior-subor-
dinate relationships) and we do not anticipate this pattern to wither
away.
This does not mean that patterns of stratification are always ri-
gid. China, Cuba and other societies which have experienced recent so-
cialist revolutions are cases in point. Differential rewards of money
and power have not been completely eliminated, yet the differences in
lifestyle from the top to the bottom of these societies have become
less visible and presumably less real. It may be possible to accomplish
similar reforms in American society, not by means of revolution, but by
means of powerful organizations of poor people.
All New Left organizations, including WMLA, share a utopian vision
of the future. They see the possibilities for a Marxist "Garden of Eden"
where all people are equal. We think that this is unrealistic. As a
community-based benefits organization they may make a worthwhile contri-
bution to the poor (BENE I), but they cannot change the way technological
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societies operate. WMLA and NATLFED may, however, be able to improve
the relative conditions of the poor by slowly narrowing the economic
gaps separating class groups. If this is to happen, significant power
bases need to be established at the local, state and national level so
that the poor can begin to influence the course of political events.
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